Q: I have a question about futarchy: I’ve read the futarchy mini-paper/webpage, admittedly not the longer paper… separating voting on values, betting on beliefs mostly makes sense up until the point where I try to understand what we would be betting on and how it would be evaluated. Prediction markets I’ve participated in have been very low-resolution, but most implemented policies seem broad, and evaluating their success/failure seems to require higher resolution. Could we have an example futarchy workflow for a presumed example policy, from voting to betting to resolving bets?
Q: Question for Mark Miller: Who coined the term “paretotopia”? Eric Drexler has been using it since I first met him ~3 years ago, and I just assumed it was his term.
- A: I no longer use “paretotopia” because it implies a state that can be reached, instead I use paretotropism, a dynamic, a motion.
Q: If everyone is gonna be wayyyy better off, will folks have the same fairness intuitions, as opposed to inequal futures?
- A: Yes: if we are in a place with much to gain by all, there’s more focus on cooperating than sniping, but there are a lot of other factors in the mix.
Q: If we assume that Alice and Bob have unequal bargaining power, how does that affect your diagrams? Do we need more complex charts?
- A: Seeing those diagrams would be interesting.
Q: I’m confused by your talk: what’s your claim Mark?
- A: We should be looking for ways to amplify and accelerate cooperative ability. New tech can unlock this.
Q: Whether or not futarchy works can be tested. Whether I think they can work matters to motivate the creation of tests. Confusion comes in: how can we tell when a policy achieved its goals?
- A: The organizations with the most solid agreement are for-profit companies. There’s a stock price that represents the future value of this organization.
- Example: Should we replace the CEO of Firm X?
- The stock price fluctuates based on willingness to purchase at different prices.
- Two scenarios: we keep the CEO, or we dump her. One market trades on the “Keep CEO” assumption and will be called off if she’s dumped. One market trades on the “Dump CEO” assumption and will be called off if she’s kept.
- The market that bets the value of the company will be higher shows which action should be taken. This isn’t a perfect thing, but might improve over the status quo.
Q: Personal commitment and human honor and integrity are ancient coordination technologies that should not be ignored
Q: Will AIs have envy?
Q: Irrational people exist… so how does that jive with the Pareto case?
- A: How do others’ states affect my states? The diagram depends on the independence of actors. So we are not accounting for negative-sum thinking on purpose.
Q: Done any research on the merging of players? Ex: DAOs can coordinate with other DAOs. Have you looked hard at “Alice and Bob negotiating with Mary and Dave”?
- A: This is pretty much the same problem with more variables, apply combinatorial reasoning
Q: My utility function is complicated and contains contradictions. And utility functions are coupled in both positive and negative ways: I’ll take a negative result if it makes my son better off. How does this weigh-in?
- A: These graphs are distilled to attempt to get at some constrained truths
Q: Can I sniff the behavioral exhaust to determine where I should drive next?